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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Keene Courtney Queensborough, who pled 
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to two counts of a 
seven count indictment, appeals from the judgment of 
sentence. He raises four issues, but in essence all challenge 
the District Court's grant of an upward departure under the 




FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On February 15, 1996, Queensborough and Boman 
Rabsatt, a juvenile, accosted a man and a woman who were 
staying at the Cinnamon Bay Campground, which is part of 
the United States National Park in St. John, Virgin Islands. 
They first robbed the campers; then they forced them to an 
isolated section of the beach area. Rabsatt took the male 
victim further down the beach, forced him to lie face down, 
and put something that felt like a gun to the back of his 
head. Queensborough took the female victim over to some 
rocks and ordered her to take off her pants. When she 
began to pray aloud, he threatened to kill her. After 
demanding that she turn around and face the rocks, 
Queensborough held a gun to the woman's head and raped 
her. During the rape he told her, "[i]f you make a sound, I'll 
blow your fucking head off." Queensborough also forced the 
woman to perform oral sex, and raped her again. 
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Queensborough then said that his friend "had to have 
some of what he just had." He took the woman to the place 
where her male companion was being held and switched 
places with Rabsatt, who also raped the woman repeatedly 
at gunpoint and forced her to perform oral sex. 
Queensborough and Rabsatt then brought the man and the 
woman back together and began to talk about killing them. 
One of the perpetrators said that they had a boat and that 
"two other guys were waiting for them." One perpetrator 
also said that they might bring the woman with them and 
asked her if she could swim a half mile. Queensborough 
and Rabsatt then ordered the man and the woman to have 
sex with each other while the two perpetrators watched. 
Throughout the ordeal, they threatened the two victims 
with death at the point of a gun. 
 
Both rapists were apprehended and charged. 
Queensborough was indicted in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas/St. John, on seven 
counts as follows: Count One for aggravated rape; Count 
Two for kidnapping with intent to commit rape; Count 
Three for kidnapping; Counts Four and Five for robbery; 
Count Six for possession of a deadly weapon during 
commission of a crime of violence; and Count Seven for 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence. Counts One through Six charged violations of 
territorial law, five of which were assimilated into federal 
law pursuant to the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 




1. The ACA provides that: 
 
       Whoever within or upon any [federal enclave] is guilty of any act 
or 
       omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of 
       Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the 
       jurisdiction of the State [or] Territory . . in which such place is 
       situated, . . . shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a 
like 
       punishment. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 13(a). 
 
We have explained: 
 
       Under the ACA, if conduct prohibited by state [or territorial] law 
       occurs on federal land, the state criminal law is assimilated into 
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There was a delay in proceeding with the charges against 
Queensborough during the period he was declared not 
competent to stand trial. After he was declared to have 
regained his competency, Queensborough reached a plea 
agreement with the government pursuant to which he pled 
guilty to Count One, which charged the assimilated crime 
of aggravated rape, in violation of Title 14 V.I.C.,SS 1701(2) 
and 1700(c) and 18 U.S.C. SS 13 and 2, and Count Seven, 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) and 2. 
 
The plea agreement between Queensborough and the 
government provides that "[t]he United States Attorney 
reserves its right to allocute at the time of sentencing . . . . 
The government further agrees to recommend a sentence 
within the applicable Guidelines range." App. at 103. It also 
contains the following: 
 
       The parties agree that the Court shall be free to impose 
       whatever sentence is deemed appropriate, and that the 
       Court shall not be bound by the parties' 
       recommendations at the time of sentencing. 
 
       The parties agree that the final determination of the 
       applicable sentence under the Guidelines, including 
       any and all adjustments and determination of the 
       defendant's criminal history category, shall be left to 
       the Court after its review of the Presentence Report. 
       However, the parties shall be free to object to any 
       Guideline calculations and other information contained 
       in the Presentence Report, and to appeal from the 
       sentence imposed . . . . 
 
App. at 105. 
 
The total offense level for the aggravated rape was 32 and 
the guideline range for that count was 121-151 months 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       federal law so long as that conduct is not already made punishable 
       by any `enactment of Congress.' In other words, the ACA fills gaps 
       in the law applicable to federal enclaves, ensures uniformity 
between 
       criminal prohibitions applicable within the federal enclave and 
       within the surrounding state, and provides residents of federal 
       enclaves with the same protection as those outside its boundaries. 
 
United States v. Hall, 979 F.2d 320, 322 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation 
omitted). 
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imprisonment.2 After hearing from the parties on the 
sentencing issue, the court sentenced Queensborough on 
the aggravated rape count to a term of twenty years 
imprisonment, which represented a substantial upward 
departure. On the firearm count, the court sentenced 
Queensborough to a term of 60 months imprisonment, to 
be served consecutively, a term set by statute pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4 and 18 U.S.C. S 924(c). Queensborough's 
attorney objected to the District Court's sentence as an 
abuse of discretion. App. at 97. After the sentencing 
hearing was completed, Queensborough's attorney raised 
"an additional objection to the legality of the sentence," 
stating that although she and Queensborough had been 
given notice by the Probation Office of "a possibility of 
upward departure," they had not been given notice"that 
there was actually going to be an upward departure." App. 
at 101. 
 
Queensborough filed a timely appeal. The District Court 
had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231 and this court has jurisdiction over the appeal 








Notice of Intent to Upwardly Depart 
 
Queensborough first argues that the District Court failed 
to give him reasonable notice of its intent to upwardly 
depart from the sentencing guidelines and failed to identify 
with specificity the grounds for said departure. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Sentencing Guidelines apply to convictions under the ACA and 
direct the sentencing court to "apply the most analogous offense 
guideline." U.S.S.G. S 2X5.1. Here, the court applied the guideline in 
U.S.S.G. S 2A3.1 for criminal sexual abuse as most analogous to the 
crime of aggravated rape. 
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Although Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure does not contain any language requiring that the 
District Court give the defendant notice of a possible 
upward departure, the Supreme Court has held that, 
 
       before a district court can depart upward on a ground 
       not identified as a ground for upward departure either 
       in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission 
       by the Government, . . . the district court[is required 
       to] give the parties reasonable notice that it is 
       contemplating such a ruling. This notice must 
       specifically identify the ground on which the district 
       court is contemplating an upward departure. 
 
Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991) 
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Barr , 963 F.2d 
641, 655-56 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
The government argues that Queensborough was given 
advance notice that satisfied Burns because the ground for 
departure on which the court relied was "identified as . . . 
ground[s] for upward departure . . . in the presentence 
report." 501 U.S. at 138. The government refers to the 
following language in the PSR, which appears under the 
heading "Factors That May Warrant Departure": 
 
       91. Presentation of information in this section does 
       not necessarily constitute a recommendation by the 
       probation officer for a departure. 
 
       92. According to U.S.S.G. S 2A3.1, Application Note 5, 
       "If a victim was sexually abused by more than one 
       participant, an upward departure may be warranted, 
       See S 5K2.8 (Extreme Conduct)." 
 
Like the government, the District Court regarded the PSR 
as having provided the requisite notice. In sentencing 
Queensborough, the court stated: 
 
       As is recited in the Presentence Report, and so that 
       counsel had notice, Paragraph 92, according to the 
       basic Sentencing Guideline that applies here for 
       criminal sexual abuse, an upward departure is 
       warranted if the victim was sexually abused by more 
       than one participant, and as well under Section 
       5(k)(2.8) [sic], which deals with extreme conduct. 
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        And as it says, if the defendant's conduct is 
       unusually heinous, cruel, brutal or degrading -- well, 
       for a rape, I don't know that it qualifies as unusually 
       heinous, cruel or brutal; however, to then order the 
       two victims to have sex themselves, in your presence, 
       at the point of a gun, is unusually degrading. So I'm 
       not going to prolong it any longer. 
 
App. at 95 (emphasis added). 
 
The District Court thus read the PSR to give notice (1) 
that an upward departure was warranted (2) based on the 
sexual abuse by two perpetrators and other extreme 
conduct in connection with the sexual abuse. We agree 
with the District Court's conclusion that the PSR gave the 
required notice that a departure could be warranted and 
that it could be on the basis of extreme conduct, a 
conclusion supported by the PSR's reference to S 5K2.8 and 
extreme conduct in its quotation of the application note. 
 
Queensborough relies on two opinions in support of his 
contention that he was not given the required notice: the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Burns and this court's decision 
in Barr. In Burns, a former supervisor in the United States 
Agency for International Development (AID) who had 
authorized payment of AID funds into an account that he 
controlled pled guilty to a three-count information charging 
him with theft of Government funds, making false claims 
against the government, and attempted tax evasion. The 
plea agreement expressed the parties' expectation that the 
petitioner would be sentenced within the guidelines range 
corresponding to an offense level of 19 and a criminal 
history category of I. The PSR confirmed this expectation 
and expressly concluded that "[t]here are no factors that 
would warrant departure from the guideline sentence." 
Burns, 501 U.S. at 131. Nonetheless, the district court 
departed upward from the guideline sentencing range 
without any prior notice to the defendant. The district court 
based its departure on (1) the extensive duration of 
petitioner's criminal conduct; (2) the disruption to 
governmental functions caused by petitioner's conduct; and 
(3) petitioner's use of his tax evasion offense to conceal his 
theft and false claims offenses. 
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It was in this "extraordinary case," id.  at 135, where the 
defendant was given no inkling in either the PSR or in a 
prehearing submission by the government that there might 
be grounds for an upward departure, that the Supreme 
Court held that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 required the district 
court to provide "reasonable notice that it [was] 
contemplating" an upward departure and to specifically 
identify the ground for the contemplated departure. The 
Court expressly noted that "[i]n the ordinary case, the 
presentence report or the Government's own 
recommendation will notify the defendant that an upward 
departure will be at issue and of the facts that allegedly 
support such a departure." Id. Unlike the"extraordinary" 
situation in Burns, here the PSR did identify "a ground for 
upward departure." Inasmuch as the PSR satisfied the 
basic requirement of Burns ("before a district court can 
depart upward on a ground not identified as a ground for 
upward departure . . . in the presentence report"), 
Queensborough was not entitled to additional notice from 
the court. 
 
Barr is similarly distinguishable. In that case, the district 
court decided to depart upward by four levels based on the 
fact that the defendant, a former assistant to the Attorney 
General, "held a high ranking position with the Department 
of Justice and that criminal activity by public officials tends 
to erode public confidence in government." Barr, 963 F.2d 
at 654. Unlike the PSR in Burns, the PSR in Barr did 
identify a possible ground for departure in the section 
captioned "Factors That May Warrant Departure," but it 
identified only one possible ground, i.e., the commission of 
" `the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the 
commission of another offense.' " Id. at 652. The PSR 
explicitly stated that the probation officer had" `identified 
no other factors warranting a departure.' " Id. at 653. 
 
On appeal, we held that the case was governed by Burns, 
and reversed. We held that inasmuch as the PSR had not 
identified the ground relied on by the district court as a 
possible ground for upward departure, the defendant 
should have received notice of the district court's intent to 
depart based on his high ranking government position. We 
noted that the government never directly requested a 
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departure and that the only reference to a "likelihood of 
departure" based on the defendant's high ranking position 
was the probation officer's statement, in an addendum to a 
revised version of the PSR, that a letter submitted by the 
government could be read to contain an "inference" that a 
departure might be warranted by the "unique combination 
of offense and Governmental position in Barr's case." Id. at 
656. We held that "finding just an `inference'. . . does not 
deem a departure appropriate or give the defendant 
sufficient notice that a departure is sought." Id. 
 
Here, by contrast, there was more than "just an 
inference" that a departure might be appropriate. As we 
have already explained, the District Court permissibly 
interpreted paragraph 92 of the PSR as identifying sexual 
abuse by two perpetrators and other extreme conduct in 
connection with the sexual abuse as possible grounds for 
departure. A reasonable reader would understand both 
from the placement and language of paragraph 92 in 
Queensborough's PSR that, in light of the circumstances, 
an upward departure based on extreme conduct was both 
possible and warranted. We disagree with Queensborough 
that paragraph 92 was ineffective to give him notice simply 
because paragraph 91 of the PSR stated that "information 
in this section does not necessarily constitute a 
recommendation . . . for a departure" (emphasis added). 
The possible grounds were identified in the PSR, and we do 
not read either Burns or Barr as requiring any more. 
 
Queensborough makes the additional argument that he 
lacked notice of the factual basis for the departure. We 
disagree. Not only does the PSR review in excruciating 
detail the circumstances of the sexual assaults on the 
female victim but the PSR, under the heading Part E. 
FACTORS THAT MAY WARRANT DEPARTURE, which 
appears in large type and bold face, also quotes the 
application note to U.S.S.G. S 2A3.1 which states that an 
upward departure may be warranted when one of the 
victims was sexually abused by more than one participant. 
The application note, quoted verbatim in the PSR, then 
includes a citation to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.8, and in parenthesis 
"(Extreme Conduct)." That guideline, S 5K2.8, provides: 
 
                                9 
  
       If the defendant's conduct was unusually heinous, 
       cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim, the court may 
       increase the sentence above the guideline range to 
       reflect the nature of the conduct. Examples of extreme 
       conduct include torture of a victim, gratuitous 
       infliction of injury, or prolonging of pain or humiliation. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.8. 
 
That Queensborough's conduct was "unusually heinous, 
cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim" is evident from the 
numerous facts previously detailed in the PSR, which 
include multiple rapes, forced oral sex, two victims, 
repeated death threats, and multiple attackers. The District 
Court focused on the "unusually degrading" order to the 
two victims to have sex in the presence of the perpetrators 
when it stated that it was departing upward based on the 
extreme conduct. App. at 95, 113. That there could be an 
upward departure on this basis could have come as no 
surprise to Queensborough; this aspect of his conduct 
featured prominently in the PSR's discussion of his offense.3 
 
In light of the explicit description of the sordid facts, we 
believe Queensborough did not lack notice of the factual 
basis for the departure. In fact, at sentencing 
Queensborough's counsel did not object on the basis that 
she lacked notice that these facts might support a 
departure; indeed, she acknowledged having notice that 
"there was a possibility of upward departure." App. at 101. 
Her objection was simply to the lack of notice that"there 
was actually going to be an upward departure." App. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The PSR summarized the female victim's statement: 
 
       [T]he two rapists told [the victims] that they . . . would now have 
sex 
       together and that she would be on top. One of them pushed [the 
       woman] down on top of [the man], who was now lying face-up in the 
       sand. The rapists told [the woman] to take off her clothes -- 
       everything except her socks. [The man] was told to take off his 
       pants. [The victims] pretended to have sex but one of the rapists 
put 
       his hand between their genital area and stated that[the man's] 
       penis was not hard. The rapist said that if [he] did not get hard 
       within thirty seconds, they would kill him. [The woman] pleaded 
       with the rapists to give [him] time, that he was frightened. 
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101. But Burns contains no such requirement and 
Queensborough cites to no authority that does. 
 
We conclude therefore that under the circumstances 





Breach of the Plea Agreement 
 
Queensborough next asserts that the government violated 
its plea agreement to recommend a sentence within the 
applicable guidelines range. Queensborough concedes that 
he did not raise this objection in the District Court. 
However, we have stated that whether the government 
violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law 
subject to plenary review that may be raised on direct 
appeal despite the defendant's failure to raise the issue at 
sentencing. See United States v. Moscahlaidis , 868 F.2d 
1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989). But see, e.g., United States v. 
Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1076-77 (4th Cir. 1991) (reviewing 
district court's resolution of whether government breached 
plea agreement under clearly erroneous standard); United 
States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1337 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(same). 
 
We have made clear that the government has an 
obligation to " `adhere strictly to the terms of the bargain it 
strikes with defendants.' " Moscahlaidis , 868 F.2d at 1361 
(quoting United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3d 
Cir. 1977)). "Because the defendant, by entering into the 
plea, surrenders a number of her constitutional rights, 
`courts are compelled to scrutinize closely the promise 
made by the government in order to determine whether it 
has been performed.' " United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 
F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. 
Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1991)). In determining 
whether the government has violated the terms of the plea 
agreement, we ask "whether the government's conduct is 
consistent with the parties' reasonable understanding of the 
agreement." United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 142 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). 
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The government does not disagree with Queensborough's 
understanding that it was to recommend a sentence within 
the applicable guidelines, and it maintains that it did. 
Indeed, in her allocution at the sentencing hearing the 
prosecutor stated that "the government believes that a 
sentence of 151 months for the act of aggravated rape is an 
appropriate sentence, covering the conduct of this 
defendant . . . ." App. at 79-80. As the guideline range for 
that crime was 121-151 months, the government's 
recommendation is consistent with its plea agreement. 
 
Queensborough argues that the government paid only 
"lip service" to its agreement and that it implicitly suggested 
to the court that an upward departure was warranted. 
Queensborough's argument that the government failed to 
honor its agreement is based on the following colloquy: 
 
       [THE GOVERNMENT] But the Court has to acknowledge 
       that these crimes are very serious and very savage. 
       This defendant raped -- this is a situation not so much 
       unlike the case of the sentencing Attorney Wood[for 
       Queensborough] mentioned, where a defendant 
       committed -- 
 
       [THE COURT] It is like or not like? 
 
       [THE GOVERNMENT] It's not unlike that case, because this 
       is a situation where we have three separate acts of 
       sexual abuse occurring by this defendant that night. 
       [outlining each assault] . . . . So, this is a situation 
       where probably, you know, different acts of sexual 
       aggravated rape could have been charged, but only one 
       was charged to cover this conduct. 
 
        So I think that this is a very savage and very serious 
       crime. And even though the government in the plea 
       agreement has agreed to recommend the sentence 
       within the guideline range, the plea agreement does 
       acknowledge that a departure is warranted when 
       there's more than one victim.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This appears to have been a misstatement. The prosecutor apparently 
intended to refer to the presentence report, which would have been an 
accurate reference. Queensborough now argues the slip of the tongue 
supports his claim but made no attempt to correct the matter at the 
sentencing level, where it was more likely to have been useful. 
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        I think here we have a situation where you have 
       [female victim] being savagely abused by this 
       defendant, and then you have [male victim] as well 
       being abused by this defendant. 
 
        So, this is a situation, I think, that calls for a sentence 
       at the higher end of the guideline range, and the 
       government believes that a sentence of 151 months for 
       the act of aggravated rape is an appropriate sentence, 
       covering the conduct of this defendant against both 
       [victims]. 
       [discussion of another case that the court had 
       questioned him about] 
 
        So the fact that there were two victims here is an 
       aggravating factor the Court should take into account. If 
       not, the government is recommending the high end of 
       the guideline range, but it is factor that would warrant 
       that sentence. . . . 
 
App. 78-80 (emphases added). 
 
The plea agreement provided that each side retained the 
right to allocute at sentencing. This is the essence of the 
government's allocution on this issue before the District 
Court at sentencing. The government, having recommended 
a sentence at the high end of the guideline range, offered 
reasons in support of that recommendation. It happened 
that those reasons, as the government noted, also 
warranted an upward departure, but the government 
explicitly stated that it was recommending a sentence 
within the applicable guideline range. This was consistent 
with the agreement. Nothing in the plea agreement suggests 
or states that the government may not make the statements 
it did. 
 
Queensborough emphasizes the decision of the First 
Circuit in United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 
1992), where the court stated that the government is 
prohibited not only from an "explicit repudiation of the 
government's assurances, but [the agreement] must in the 
interests of fairness be read to forbid end-runs around 
them." Id. at 269 (citation and quotations omitted). We 
agree with the principle, but we do not agree with 
Queensborough that the prosecutor made an "end run" 
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around the agreement in this case. Although the prosecutor 
made a misstatement, see note 4 supra , the District Court 
was aware of both the plea agreement and the PSR, and 
there is no likelihood that it was influenced as a result. 
 
Nor do we think that the prosecutor's remarks 
concerning the savageness of Queensborough's conduct 
constituted a breach of the plea agreement. The 
prosecutor's statement, quoted above supra, was made in 
response to defense counsel's argument that 
Queensborough should be sentenced to 121 months, the 
low end of the guideline range. In support of this argument, 
defense counsel referred, inter alia, to the sentence given a 
defendant named Caswell Fredericks in another rape case. 
Fredericks had pled guilty to four aggravated rapes, and 
Queensborough's counsel, in attempting to analogize to the 
Fredericks situation, emphasized that Fredericks had"also 
received the ten year minimum mandatory, and thefive 
years on the gun . . . . And that was on four separate 
occasions, each of which being an aggravated rape." App. at 
69. We think it clear that, in this case, the prosecutor's 
emphasis on the severity of Queensborough's crime and on 
the fact that multiple rapes could have been charged for his 
conduct was in response to the Fredericks allusion and was 
intended to support the government's recommendation of 
151 months, the high end of the guideline range, rather 
than the 120 months to which Fredericks was sentenced. 
 
Queensborough hones in on the following two sentences 
of the government's allocution: 
 
       So the fact that there were two victims here is an 
       aggravating factor the Court should take into account. 
       If not, the government is recommending the high end 
       of the guideline range, but it is factor that would 
       warrant that sentence. . . . 
 
App. at 80. 
 
We do not agree with Queensborough's charge that by 
this statement the prosecutor "only suggested a sentence 
within the guidelines range . . . as an alternative if the 
court did not upward depart." Appellant's Br. at 21. When 
the entirety of the prosecutor's statements on 
Queensborough's sentence is read, it is manifest that she 
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initially referred the court to the government's promise to 
recommend a sentence within the guideline range, App. at 
79, and then, on two occasions, explicitly stated that the 
government was recommending to the court a sentence 
within that range. App. at 79, 80. In that context, the 
reference to "an aggravating factor" can only be read as a 
basis for a sentence at the high end of the guideline range, 
as the prosecutor made clear by adding "is [a] factor that 
would warrant that sentence. . . ." App. at 80. 
Queensborough does not point to any statement by the 
prosecutor recommending that the court depart upward 
because there is no such statement. 
 
The plea agreement recognized that the District Court 
was free to reject the government's recommendation. The 
court chose to do so, and, as is evident from the court's 
remarks, it did so on the basis of its abhorrence of the 
circumstances of the crime. Notably, the plea agreement did 
not provide that Queensborough was free to withdraw his 
plea if the court sentenced him to a longer prison term. Cf. 
United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 792 n.5 (5th Cir. 
1997) (agreement provided that defendant could withdraw 
guilty plea if court set an offense level higher than that in 
the plea agreement). The prosecutor adhered to the terms of 
the agreement, and we see no basis to vacate the sentence 






In addition to his challenge to the process leading to the 
departure, Queensborough asserts two separate but related 
challenges to the fact of departure. First, he contends that 
the District Court's decision to upwardly depart from the 
guidelines based on extreme conduct is not supported by 
the record and that such a departure was not permissible 
under the guidelines. Second, he contends that the District 
Court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 
upward departure. We review a district court's decision to 
depart from the applicable guideline range for abuse of 
discretion. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99-100 
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(1996). "A district court by definition abuses its discretion 
when it makes an error of law." Id. at 100. 
 
A district court must order a sentence within the relevant 
guideline range " `unless the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that 
should result in a sentence different from that described.' " 
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b)). In Koon, the Supreme 
Court noted that the sentencing guidelines provide 
"considerable guidance . . . by listing certain factors as 
either encouraged or discouraged bases for departure." 518 
U.S. at 94. Encouraged factors are those "the Commission 
has not been able to take into account fully in formulating 
the guidelines." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0. Because extreme conduct 
under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.8 is an encouraged factor, see, e.g., 
United States v. Lewis, 115 F.3d 1531, 1539 (11th Cir. 
1997), the sentencing court may depart if the "applicable 
guideline does not already take it into account," United 
States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1999). If, on 
the other hand, the applicable sentencing guideline does 
take the encouraged factor into account, the sentencing 
court may depart upward if the encouraged factor" `is 
present to a degree substantially in excess of that which 
ordinarily is involved in the offense.' " Koon, 518 U.S. at 95 
(quoting U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0). 
 
Queensborough's PSR calculated his offense level as 32 
and his Criminal History as I, resulting in a guideline range 
of 121-151 months imprisonment. As noted above, the 
District Court, granting an upward departure, sentenced 
Queensborough to 240 months (20 years) imprisonment on 
the aggravated rape count and to the statutorily mandated 
sentence of 60 months on the firearm count, to run 
consecutively. It is the sentence for the aggravated rape 
that is the basis for the appeal. 
 
1. Record Support for the Departure 
 
Queensborough argues that the record does not support 
the finding of extreme conduct because both of the victims 
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stated that they only pretended to have sex with each other. 
That argument is a non sequitur. Being put in a position 
where the victim must pretend to have sex is degrading; 
"extreme" is defined by the guidelines to encompass 
degrading conduct. See U.S.S.G. S 5K2.8. Moreover, the 
court stated at sentencing that it was the order itself to 
have sex that was degrading. 
 
Queensborough then asserts that the District Court erred 
by failing to make any comparison between the degradation 
in this case and a "typical" sexual assault case. In essence, 
Queensborough argues that the District Court should have 
established a factual basis involving a typical sexual 
assault case, thereby providing a baseline against which to 
compare Queensborough's conduct. The comparison to 
which Queensborough alludes appears to be that which 
may be required when departing based on extreme 
psychological injury under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3, which applies 
"[i]f a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much 
more serious than that normally resulting from commission 
of the offense." Although rape is a particularly intrusive 
crime, probably more than any other, and the victim of a 
rape may suffer severe psychological damage for long 
periods, if not forever, the District Court did not depart on 
the basis of S 5K2.3 but under S 5K2.8. That section only 
requires that the court determine that the conduct involved 
"was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading." 
 
The District Judge, who had considerable experience 
presiding over criminal cases, did not err in characterizing 
the events as degrading and Queensborough's conduct as 
extreme. Given the repetitive number of instances of 
intrusive physical contact, the order that the two victims 
have sex, and the repeated death threats, the record amply 
supports a departure based on extreme conduct. See United 
States v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 1149, 1150-51 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming departure under U.S.S.G. SS 5K2.8 and 5K2.3 
based on defendant's conduct during rape and on severe 
psychological injury); Lewis, 115 F.3d at 1538-39 (affirming 
departure under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.8 based on number and 
nature of assaults). 
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2. Whether the Departure was Authorized 
 
Queensborough also argues that no upward departure 
was legally permissible because his conduct was already 
taken into account by the guidelines. Queensborough does 
not suggest that the 20 year sentence imposed by the 
District Court was unauthorized by statute. Under the ACA, 
which applies here because the offense took place on 
federal land, i.e., a national park, Queensborough was 
subject to "a like punishment" to that applicable under the 
state or territorial law. 18 U.S.C. S 13(a). Courts have 
interpreted "like punishment" to mean that state law sets 
the minimum and maximum punishment while the federal 
sentencing guidelines should be used to determine the 
actual sentence within that range. See, e.g., United States 
v. Pierce, 75 F.3d 173, 176 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Marmolejo, 915 F.2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250, 254 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 
In this case, Queensborough was charged with the 
assimilated crime of aggravated rape which carries a term 
of imprisonment of 10 years to life under Virgin Islands 
law. See 14 V.I.C. S 1700(c). Therefore, the District Court, 
although required to determine the actual sentence using 
the federal sentencing guidelines, was authorized to 
sentence within that range, i.e., up to life imprisonment. 
 
The thrust of Queensborough's argument is that his 
offense level was increased by four levels for aggravated 
sexual assault by force or threat and an additional four 
levels for abduction, thereby resulting in an adjusted 
offense level of 35, which he claims took into account all of 
his conduct, including any degradation associated with 
criminal sexual abuse. We disagree. As an encouraged 
factor under the guidelines, extreme conduct may be the 
basis for an upward departure if the "applicable guideline 
does not already take it into account," Iannone, 184 F.3d at 
226, or, if the guideline does take it into account, if the 
factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of that 
ordinarily involved in the offense. It is evident that the 
criminal sexual abuse guideline under which 
Queensborough was sentenced contemplates upward 
departures based on extreme conduct because the 
application notes state that such a departure may be 
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appropriate "[i]f a victim was sexually abused by more than 
one participant." U.S.S.G. S 2A3.1, Application Note 5. The 
guideline does not state, and Queensborough has not 
suggested, that abuse by more than one participant is the 
only basis for an extreme conduct departure. Here, given 
the patently degrading nature of the order that the two 
victims have sex, the District Court could properly have 
concluded that Queensborough's conduct was extreme to a 
degree not adequately taken into account by the guidelines. 
See Lewis, 115 F.3d at 1538-39. 
 
3. The Extent of the Departure 
 
Finally, Queensborough argues that even if an upward 
departure was permissible the District Court abused its 
discretion by ordering an excessive departure equivalent to 
an increase of five or six levels. He contends that even if he 
"had inflicted permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, 
the increase in his offense level would have been only four 
levels." Appellant's Br. at 28 (citing U.S.S.G.S 2A3.1(b)(4)). 
He relies on our statement that "analogy to the guidelines 
is also a useful and appropriate tool for determining what 
offense level a defendant's conduct most closely 
approximates." Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1112. However, "[a]t 
this stage, the question is no longer whether the district 
court has substituted its judgment for that of the 
Sentencing Commission, but whether the court of appeals 
should substitute its judgment for that of the district 
court." Id. at 1110. 
 
Our dissenting colleague, who agrees that an upward 
departure was appropriate, nonetheless would remand 
because he believes that the District Court gave"no clue as 
to why it decided that a five-level departure was 
warranted," dissenting op. at 33, and that "the 
reasonableness of the degree of departure in this case is 
not apparent from the record." Dissenting op. at 34. He 
would follow the process that we used in United States v. 
Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792 (3d Cir. 1999). Unlike our colleague, 
we believe that both the justification for an upward 
departure of the extent given and the District Court's 
reasons are fully set forth on the record. 
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The PSR, which was available to both the defense and the 
District Court, contains a Victim Impact Statement from 
each of the two victims. Lest there be any question about 
the extent of the psychological injury to the victims, a brief 
review of the written statement of the female victim, who 
said that she "knew bad things did happen, but did not 
know that evil like this existed," which was included in the 
PSR, fully sets forth the "devastating" effect on her of the 
brutality of the multiple rapes. She related that, inter alia, 
she had "cried every day for months;" "continuing 
nightmares;" "continuing months of counseling;" "loss of 
the ability to focus on meditation or prayer without 
becoming distracted by reliving the horror of that night;" 
"waiting in terror for [AIDS] and pregnancy testing;" "the 
horror, shame, and embarrassment, when news of this 
appeared in newspapers and on t.v. programs;""the 
difficulty of trying to handle the everyday events of life while 
dealing with this;" "much of what made my life happy and 
worth living was not available to me for many months. . . 
and in some ways may never return." 
 
The written statement of the male victim included in the 
PSR was similar. He related that "[t]he hatred, brutality, 
and violence that we were subjected to . . . has 
permanently changed my life;" he became "incredibly 
fragile;" "experienced repeated and uncontrollable panic . . . 
directly related to the violent crimes;" because"during 
much of the violence, I was held down from behind, with a 
gun in the back of my head or in the side of my face. . . [in 
the months that followed] I frequently panicked, fearing 
that someone was about to attack me from behind, only to 
turn and find no one;" "could no longer walk alone [in the 
forest] without panic and extreme anxiety;""sought and 
received weekly counseling;" had not fully healed"more 
than one and one-half years after that violent night;" "I still 
find myself lying awake thinking about the horrors of that 
night." 
 
Both victims commented in their written statements 
about the length of the sentence that the District Court had 
to set. The female victim wrote, "I know you can not return 
[my happy spirit] to me, but you can make certain that 
others don't lose theirs as well. It is my belief, backed by 
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many studies, that if freedom is given to this person before 
he reaches middle age he will repeat the violent crimes he 
has committed. That price for his freedom is too high. You 
stand between this man and the brutality with which he 
will treat other people." The male victim also wrote, "I 
sincerely believe that if he is not sentenced to many years 
in jail, he will again commit horrific crimes, and in the 
future, he may not allow the victims to live. I feel a deep 
responsibility to call the attention of the legal system to this 
danger, and the court has a deep responsibility to ensure 
that others are not endangered by this man." Andfinally, 
he wrote, "there is no doubt that each of these men is 
capable of murder. Please do not allow these men to hurt 
or to kill others." 
 
The PSR, of course, is available and part of the record. 
But if the written statements of the victims did not 
sufficiently set forth the circumstances and effect of 
Queensborough's crime, these victims felt so strongly about 
the sentencing that, unlike most victims of rape who shun 
further contact with the case once the trial is over, they 
both returned for the sentencing hearing and gave their 
statements in person and in the presence of the court. 
Those statements are included as an Appendix to this 
opinion. We find nothing in the Jacobs opinion that is 
comparable. 
 
The District Court was not unaware of the need to 
articulate the reasons for the upward departure to the 
extent it chose, but apparently believed, with good reason, 
that it was apparent from the record that had just been 
made. Thus, in sentencing Queensborough, the District 
Court, having just heard the moving and explicit 
statements of both victims, made in open court, stated at 
the outset: 
 
       THE COURT: Mr. Queensborough, I don't know that 
       there's a whole lot I can say to you, other than what 
       [the female victim] and [the male victim] have very 
       eloquently told you right now. 
 
       . . . 
 
        The cases alluded to by your counsel earlier are 
       different, they are distinguishable from this, while they 
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       were certainly very bad and dangerous and brutal, but 
       they do not reach the level of brutality that you did to 
       these two people. 
 
        Not only do I think that it is, that sentencing you on 
       the high . . . end of the guidelines is appropriate, I 
       think that it does warrant departure upward. 
 
The court stated that "this case is totally senseless . . . . So 
I think that this is one of those instances where the Court 
is justified in departing upward." After confirming with the 
U.S. Attorney that "the maximum sentence for this is life," 
the court imposed the sentence of 20 years on Count 1 and 
the mandatory 5 years on Count 2. 
 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that we are to 
afford substantial deference to a District Court's sentencing 
decision: 
 
       A district court's decision to depart from the Guidelines 
       . . . will in most cases be due substantial deference, for 
       it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a 
       sentencing court. Before a departure is permitted, 
       certain aspects of the case must be found unusual 
       enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in 
       the Guideline. . . . Whether a given factor is present to 
       a degree not adequately considered by the Commission, 
       or whether a discouraged factor nonetheless justifies 
       departure because it is present in some unusual or 
       exceptional way, are matters determined in large part 
       by comparison with the facts of other Guideline cases. 
       District courts have an institutional advantage over 
       appellate courts in making these sorts of 
       determinations. . . . 
 
Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 (citation omitted). 
 
Applying this substantial deference, we conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in departing 
upwards to the degree it did in this case. In setting 
Queensborough's sentence, the court compared his conduct 
to that of other criminal defendants referred to by defense 
counsel during argument, and stated: "[t]he cases alluded 
to by your counsel earlier are different . . . while they were 
certainly very bad and dangerous and brutal . . . they do 
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not reach the level of brutality that you did to these two 
people." App. at 94. The court then identified the maximum 
possible sentence for Queensborough's crime, life 
imprisonment, and imposed a sentence of twenty years. The 
District Court heard the allocution by both attorneys, by 
the two victims, and by Queensborough himself. It was in 
the best position to determine whether a departure was 
warranted and, if so, the extent of the departure, and we 






For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
 




STATEMENT OF FEMALE VICTIM AT SENTENCING 
HEARING 
 
When asked if I wished to come here to make a 
statement, I initially thought that I would not want to do 
so, because I thought it would be very hard to talk about 
what happened, and I worried I would embarrass myself by 
crying. 
 
And it struck me that the worst, if I did cry, I would be 
embarrassed, is a very different result from the threat of 
that night when we were attacked by this man. He said to 
me, "You cry, you die." 
 
I chose to come here because although you can read the 
accounts of what happened that night, you cannot know 
how it felt for me to sit with a friend on a beautiful 
Valentine's Day night, and suddenly become prey to brutal 
predators who would show us repeatedly that our lives no 
longer had value, and that they could be taken at any time. 
 
You can read medical reports, but you can't know that 
during the attack, there came a time when it hurt so badly 
I considered fighting, even if it meant my life, because I 
didn't think they could kill me any more dead that I already 
felt inside. 
 
However, this was not a choice I could make at that time. 
It was something I could not do. I couldn't forfeit what little 
chance my friend had for survival. 
 
You can read of our escape, but I want you to know from 
me, it was terrifying to feel like a hunted animal, going over 
the lava rocks and cactus and dark hillside. 
 
I have never in my entire life had anything as devastating 
as this happen. This has invaded every portion of my life. 
 
I tried to think of how best to explain to you how invasive 
this has been, and I thought maybe if I shared that I cried 
every day for months and months and months, that I've 
had continuing nightmares made up of the memories of 
that night, from which I awaken screaming. And this goes 
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on, the continuing months of counseling to try to work 
through my confused emotions and fears. 
 
That for many months I experienced a loss of the ability 
to focus on meditation or prayer, without becoming 
distracted by reliving the horror of that night. 
 
That lack of ability to focus has affected other activities 
I previously enjoyed, simple things like reading and 
watching TV, or basket weaving or quilting. 
 
The embarrassment of the exasperating jumpiness with 
which I react to unexpected movement toward me. 
 
Waiting in terror for AIDS and pregnancy testing. 
 
For months I was unable to go out at night, which for me 
meant no longer taking any night classes or seeing the 
beauty of the stars, or being on the beach. 
 
Having to come back, feeling sick to my stomach when I 
am too closely surrounded by strangers, which made 
ordinary events like rejoining my exercise class, or even 
going to my own church, too difficult for many months. 
 
Activities where strangers were close by remain very 
difficult for me. I find it hard to remember that I once could 
enjoy a simple even[ing] out dancing with a group of friends 
or going to an amusement park for the day. 
 
The loss of opportunity, the promotion that disappeared 
when the administrator found out what had happened to 
me. The staff, who did not know what happened, couldn't 
understand why the promotion had suddenly disappeared 
and was not mine. I did not have the energy to argue on my 
own behalf with regards to this. 
 
The loss of friends and close family, who could not have 
handled this, and who can't handle the continuing 
difficulties that this presents. 
 
The sadness and pain of seeing my closest friends hurt 
by the fact that I was hurt. I am finding that this having 
happened to me continues to hurt those people with whom 
I become close. 
 
The horror, shame and embarrassment when news of 
this appeared in newspaper and on TV programs. The fact 
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that names were withheld did not disguise that that was 
me. 
 
The difficulty of trying to handle the everyday events of 
life while dealing with this. I can barely recall large events, 
like moving, other than extreme upset over small, minor 
things like a scratch from a cardboard box that reminded 
me of the scratches received from the lava rocks, from the 
attack that night. 
 
And the fear that I would burst into tears over nothing in 
front of people who would not have understood why I was 
reacting in such a way. 
 
The expense, which now amounts to thousands of 
dollars, for ongoing counseling, medical exams, testing, 
replacing things destroyed or lost. 
 
My life has gone on, but much of what made my life 
happy and worth living was not available to me for many 
months, and in some ways may never return. 
 
I was asked if I wanted to be compensated for the money 
that was stolen from me. I think that money was minor. I 
want returned to me my happy spirit. 
 
And I know bad things to happen, but I did not know 
that evil like this existed. I know you cannot return this to 
me, but if you delay this happening to others, the price 
others have to pay for this person's freedom is too high. 
 
You stand between this man and the brutality with which 
I firmly believe he will treat other people. I beg you to 
protect other men and women from this. 
 
This finally is what this has brought me to. I base my 
entire philosophy on personal freedom, and yet I must ask 
that you limit this man's freedom for as long as the law 
allows you to do so, in order that the freedom of other 
people may be preserved. 
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STATEMENT OF MALE VICTIM AT SENTENCING 
HEARING 
 
I'm thinking about what I can offer to you as you think 
about sentencing Mr. Queensborough. I need to pass on to 
you a bit of the horror of the night that we experienced. 
 
I can't talk to all the details of that night, and I won't, but 
a bit of it I think you need to feel and to be aware of. 
 
Right after Mr. Queensborough had himself just finished 
raping [female victim], he held me down on the ground with 
a gun at my face and to my head, and he threatened 
repeatedly to kill us. 
 
And as he went on and on in his state and threatening 
manner, he said some things that were deeply disturbing 
and that were very revealing about him. 
 
He said, "Do you know why I'm doing this to you, why I'm 
going to hurt you?" 
 
He said, "Because I've been in jail and I've been hurt. I 
don't care. I'm going to hurt you." 
 
And I laid there on the ground, trembling, thinking this 
is a person who doesn't care about himself, he has got no 
respect for himself, he has got no respect for others. He has 
no respect for human life. And this is the person that's 
holding a gun to my head and threatening to kill us, and he 
has just finished raping [female victim]. It was deeply 
disturbing and very shocking, and I lay there trembling. 
 
Somehow in his mind I believe that he rationalized what 
he was doing to us, because he had been hurt in his life. 
He said very directly that he had killed other people, and 
that it would mean nothing to him to kill us. 
 
At that moment, and as a result of that whole night, my 
sense of security in life was shattered. I have been lucky in 
my life, surrounded with a lot of love and caring, and I 
never faced, I've never faced anyone who had such a lack 
of respect for life. 
 
I've come to know a little bit of the sense of fear that 
many people go through in life, particularly women, and 
not being safe to walk, not being safe to be alone, the 
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horror of panic, see them for real, and some of them are 
basically based on the horror of that night. 
 
He said all this to me having just raped [female victim], 
and it was very clear, I know in my heart not only was he 
capable of raping, which he did, but that he was very 
capable of murder as well, of killing. 
 
We were incredibly fortunate to survive that night. We 
didn't meet his anger or that of the other assailant. We 
didn't meet their hatred. And in not meeting that, I believe 
we stopped them from killing us. 
 
I have no doubt in my heart, I know that he is capable 
of killing and capable of rape, and I believe that given the 
opportunity it will happen again, and that next time the 
victims will not survive. In fact, I believe that most people 
would not have lived through that. I feel very fortunate, to 
myself and to [female victim], that we found a way to 
survive and to try to heal afterwards. 
 
So that's why I'm here today, to talk to you about his 
sentencing. There's absolutely no sense of - - I have no 
interest at all in punishment. I have no pleasure at all 
thinking about Mr. Queensborough going to jail. In fact, I 
think it's tragic. I think it's very tragic, that since he is 
such a young a man, can be so filled with hatred and 
horror, his life so out of control that he can commit crimes 
that mean that he is not safe to be around other people. 
 
So when I think about what I think is appropriate for his 
sentencing, all I think about is the safety of others, that no 
one, there's not a person alive that should have to feel what 
we felt, that should have to fight for their lives the way we 
had to fight. And I believe that he will hurt others again, 
and that as a result the Court needs to sentence him to the 
maximum amount of sentence that is allowable. 
 
Again, I think it's tragic. There's nothing that I hate more 
than the idea of anyone leading their lives like that. But the 
safety of others is what I have to keep in mind, and that's 
why I came here today. 
 
Thank you for listening and considering that in deciding 
on his sentencing . . . . 
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STAPLETON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
I agree with my colleagues that the government did not 
breach the plea agreement. The prosecutor expressly 
advised the Court that the government had committed itself 
to recommend a sentence within the Guidelines range and 
that its recommendation was a sentence at the upper end 
of the range. In this context, the prosecutor's comment 
about "an aggravating factor" could not have communicated 
to the Court that the government was recommending a 
departure. Nevertheless, I would remand for resentencing. 
 
Queensborough was charged with conduct constituting 
"aggravated sexual abuse" under 18 U.S.C.S 2241 which, 
like the Virgin Islands rape statute, carries a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment.1 The applicable provision of 
the Guidelines is S 2A3.1, which provides a base offense 
level of 27 for "sexual abuse" as defined in 18 U.S.C. S 22422 
and specifies "Specific Offense Characteristic" upward 
increases for various aggravating circumstances. A four- 
level increase is required, for example, if a dangerous 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 2241 provides in relevant part: 
 
        (a) By force or threat. -- Whoever, in the special maritime and 
       territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal 
prison, 
       knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act -- 
 
        (1) by using force against that other person; or 
 
        (2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any 
       person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or 
       kidnaping; 
 
       or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned 
for 
       any term of years or life, or both. . . . 
 
2. Section 2242 provides in relevant part: 
 
        Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the 
       United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly-- 
 
        (1) causes another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening 
       or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or 
       placing that person in fear that any person will be subjected to 
       death, serious bodily injury, or kidnaping); . . . 
 
       or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned 
not 
       more than 20 years, or both. 
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weapon is used or displayed. An additional four-level 
increase is mandated if the victim is abducted, and still 
another four-level increase is called for if the victim 
sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury.3 
Application Note 5 to S 2A3.1 makes a cross reference to 
S 5K2.8 (departure for "extreme conduct"), which authorizes 
an upward departure for conduct that is "unusually 
heinous, cruel, brutal or degrading to the victim." The 
Application Note suggests, by way of example, that an 
upward departure under S 5K2.8 may be appropriate when 
the victim is sexually abused by more than one participant. 
 
Queensborough's sentencing judge adopted the Guideline 
calculations suggested in the Presentence Report ("PSR"): a 
Base Offense Level of 27 followed by a four-level increase 
for use of a gun, a four-level increase for abduction, a two- 
level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, and a one- 
level decrease for timely notifying the authorities of his 
intention to plead guilty. This calculation resulted in a total 
offense level of 32 and, given Queensborough's Criminal 
History Level, a sentencing range of 121 to 151 months. 
Queensborough does not challenge this calculation. The 
Court went on, however, to depart upward and to impose a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. U.S.S.G. 2A3.1(b) provides: 
 
       (b) Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
        (1) If the offense was committed by the means set forth in 18 
       U.S.C. S 2241(a) or (b) (including, but not limited to, the use or 
       display of any dangerous weapon), increase by 4 levels; 
 
        (2) (A) If the victim had not attained the age of twelve years, 
       increase by 4 levels; or (B) if the victim had attained the age of 
       twelve years but had not attained the age of sixteen years, 
increase 
       by 2 levels. 
 
        (3) If the victim was (A) in the custody, care, or supervisory 
control 
       of the defendant; or (B) a person held in the custody of a 
       correctional facility, increase by 2 levels. 
 
        (4) (A) If the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening 
bodily 
       injury, increase by 4 levels; (B) if the victim sustained serious 
bodily 
       injury, increase by 2 levels; or (C) if the degree of injury is 
between 
       that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), increase by 3 levels. 
 
        (5) If the victim was abducted, increase by 4 levels. 
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sentence of 240 months, the equivalent of at least afive- 
level increase above the total offense level of 32. 
Queensborough challenges the propriety of both the 
departure and the extent thereof. 
 
As the District Court recognized, an upward departure 
was permissible only if Queensborough's conduct was 
heinous, cruel, brutal or degrading to a degree not 
adequately taken into account by S 2A3.1 in a situation 
where the rape involved an abduction and use of a deadly 
weapon. The Court concluded that Queensborough's 
conduct was "unusually degrading to the victim" because 
"one victim [was] forced to have sex with another victim," 
App. at 113, and, based solely upon this finding, departed 
upward five levels. Like my colleagues, I agree that the 
directive to the two victims could properly support an 
upward departure. I would not affirm the District Court's 
sentence, however, because no notice was given that a 
departure on this ground was being considered and 
because the sentencing judge provided no explanation for 
the degree of his departure, a five-level, 89 month increase. 
 
In Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991), the Court 
pointed out that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, as 
amended by the Sentencing Reform Act, "provides for 
focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal 
issues relevant to determining the appropriate Guidelines 
sentence." Id. at 134 (emphasis supplied). Rule 32 does this 
in part by affording the defendant and the government the 
opportunity to comment on "matters relating to the 
appropriate sentence." Id. at 134. The Supreme Court 
concluded in Burns that Rule 32 contained an implicit 
requirement that the defendant receive notice that"an 
upward departure will be at issue and of the facts that 
allegedly support such a departure." Id. at 135 (emphasis 
supplied). As the Court explained: 
 
       In the ordinary case, the presentence report or the 
       Government's own recommendation will notify the 
       defendant that an upward departure will be at issue 
       and of the facts that allegedly support such a 
       departure. Here we deal with the extraordinary case in 
       which the district court, on its own initiative and 
       contrary to the expectations of both the defendant and 
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       the Government, decides that the factual and legal 
       predicates for a departure are satisfied. The question 
       before us is whether Congress, in enacting the 
       Sentencing Reform Act, intended that the district court 
       be free to make such a determination without notifying 
       the parties. We believe that the answer to this question 
       is clearly no. . . . 
 
        As we have set forth, Rule 32 contemplates full 
       adversary testing of the issues relevant to a Guidelines 
       sentence and mandates that the parties be given"an 
       opportunity to comment upon the probation officer's 
       determination and on other matters relating to the 
       appropriate sentence." Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(a)(1). 
       Obviously, whether a sua sponte departure from the 
       Guidelines would be legally and factually warranted is 
       a "matte[r] relating to the appropriate sentence." In our 
       view, it makes no sense to impute to Congress an 
       intent that a defendant have the right to comment on 
       the appropriateness of a sua sponte departure but not 
       the right to be notified that the court is contemplating 
       such a ruling. 
 
Burns, 501 U.S. at 135-36 (emphasis supplied). 
 
The only fact noted in the PSR under the heading 
"Factors That [Might] Warrant Departure" was the fact that 
the "victim was sexually abused by more than one 
participant." The only fact mentioned by the government at 
the sentencing hearing as possibly warranting a departure 
was the fact that "there's more than one victim." 
Understandably, in this context, defense counsel made no 
comment during his allocution on whether the order 
directing the victims to have sex was sufficiently degrading 
to warrant a departure and, if so, how large that departure 
should be. 
 
My colleagues distinguish Burns on the ground that the 
PSR here mentioned the directive to have sex in its ten- 
page, narrative account of all of the circumstances of the 
offense and cited to S 5K2.8, the Guideline section under 
which the District Court ultimately departed. Neither 
portion of the PSR, however, gave fair notice of the factual 
basis for the departure utilized by the Court. 
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While the PSR did cite to the Guideline under which the 
Court ultimately departed and thus referenced the"legal 
predicate" for the departure that ultimately occurred, that 
Guideline is so broad that it provided no hint in this 
context of the "factual predicate" that the Court was 
considering. Indeed, the PSR's citation to S 5K2.8 came in 
support of a suggested factual basis for departure wholly 
different from the one adopted by the District Court. 
Similarly, the PSR's narrative account included all the facts 
related to the crime and did nothing to dispel the idea that 
the only basis for departure being considered was that 
there were two perpetrators. 
 
In addition to adopting a novel ground for departure, the 
District Court provided no clue as to why it decided that a 
five-level departure was warranted. The Court simply noted 
that the maximum penalty authorized by the statute was 
life and then imposed a sentence of 20 years. My colleagues 
understandably believe that the extent of the District 
Court's departure was determined by reference to the 
relationship between a total sentence of twenty years and 
the maximum sentence provided by law, i.e., life. If so, the 
District Court erred. As my colleagues acknowledge, even 
when sentencing for an assimilated crime, a district court 
must still base its sentence on the Guidelines. If the 
congressionally intended uniformity is to be achieved, it is 
the value system of the Guidelines to which the sentencing 
judge must adhere. 
 
In United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 
1990), we held that once a reviewing court concludes that 
a departure is permissible, it must still determine whether 
the degree of departure was reasonable. While we 
recognized that "[a]t this stage of the inquiry, our review is 
deferential," id. at 1098, we stressed that "there must be 
some objective standards to guide the determination of 
reasonableness," id. at 1110, and that"standardless 
determinations of reasonableness [would] inevitably 
produce unwanted disparity." Id. at 1113. We concluded 
that the primary source of those objective standards must 
be the Guideline scheme itself. At the same time, we 
recognized that those standards will often be discernable in 
the Guidelines only by way of analogy and that " analogies 
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to the guidelines . . . are necessarily more open-textured 
than [direct] applications of the guidelines." Id. at 1113. 
 
In United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792 (3d Cir. 1999), 
we found implicit in Kikumura a requirement that a 
sentencing judge, when departing from the guideline range, 
"articulate the reasons for the degree of the departure." Id. 
at 798. In the absence of such an explanation or some 
other indicia in the record, it is impossible to determine 
whether the District Court has conducted the required 
analysis. Under Jacobs, where the reasonableness of the 
degree of the departure is not otherwise apparent from the 
record, a failure to provide an explanation requires a 
remand for resentencing. As will be apparent from the 
following discussion, I believe the reasonableness of the 
degree of departure in this case is not apparent from the 
record and that our precedents, accordingly, dictate a 
remand for resentencing. 
 
Consistent with our prior approach in comparable cases, 
I would not dictate to the District Court the rationale that 
it should utilize on remand in determining the degree of 
departure. It is appropriate under our precedents, however, 
to point out provisions of the Guidelines that the District 
Court might wish to consider in making that determination. 
See Jacobs 167 F.3d at 800-01. 
 
I would commend to the District Court for its 
consideration our decision in Jacobs. The defendant there 
was charged with aggravated assault on his former 
girlfriend with a knife on federal property. Section 2A2.2, 
the aggravated assault guideline, provided for a base 
offense level of 15 and for enhancements, inter alia, for use 
of a dangerous weapon (4 levels), and infliction of "Serious 
Bodily Injury" (4 levels), or "Permanent or Life-Threatening 
Bodily Injury" (6 levels).4 The sentencing court added four 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. U.S.S.G. S 2A2.2(b)(3) provides: 
 
       (b) Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
       *  *  * 
 
        (3) If the victim sustained bodily injury, increase the offense 
level 
       according to the seriousness of the injury: 
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levels for the use of a knife and six levels because the 
victim sustained permanent physical injuries. In addition, it 
departed upward five levels under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3, which 
authorizes a departure when "extreme psychological injury" 
has been inflicted on the victim.5 
 
As heretofore noted, we remanded for resentencing 
because the sentencing judge failed to explain how it 
selected a five-level departure and because the 
reasonableness of that choice was not obvious from the 
record and the Guidelines. In the course of our opinion, we 
pointed out that the Guidelines provided a basis for 
inferring that in an aggravated assault context, physical 
and non-physical injuries to the victim should be treated as 
being of substantially similar seriousness. Based on that 
inference, we suggested that in departing for a non-physical 
injury, the court should be guided by the degree of increase 
mandated for a comparable physical injury: 
 
        Under S 1B1.1(j), "serious bodily injury" includes the 
       "protracted impairment of . . . [a] mental faculty." 
       Under S 1B1.1(h), "permanent or life-threatening bodily 
       injury" includes a "substantial impairment of[a] 
       mental faculty that is likely to be permanent." These 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
         Degree of Bodily InjuryIncrease in Level 
 
       (A) Bodily Injury add 2 
       (B) Serious Bodily Injuryadd 4 
       (C) Permanent or Life-Threatening 
       Bodily Injuryadd 6 
 
        (D) If the degree of injury is between that specified in 
       subdivisions (A) and (B), add 3 levels; or 
 
        (E) If the degree of injury is between that specified in 
       subdivisions (B) and (C), add 5 levels. 
 
        Provided, however, that the cumulative adjustments from (2) and 
       (3) shall not exceed 9 levels. 
 
5. U.S.S.G. S 5K2.3 provides in part: 
 
       If a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more 
       serious than that normally resulting from commission of the 
offense, 
       the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline 
       range. 
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       definitions do not, as Jacobs argues, mean that in an 
       aggravated assault context, S 2A2.2(b) takes into 
       account all of the extraordinary psychological injuries 
       covered by S 5K2.3. . . . They may, however, provide a 
       basis for inferring that the guidelines in an aggravated 
       assault situation treat physical and non-physical 
       injuries to a victim as being of substantially similar 
       seriousness. If one draws such an inference, one may 
       further conclude that it would be inconsistent with the 
       approach of the Guidelines to depart upward four 
       levels or more under S 5K2.3 without finding that the 
       extreme psychological injury was likely to be 
       protracted. Conversely, one may conclude that it would 
       be consistent with the approach of the Guidelines to 
       depart upwards four levels if there is "extreme 
       psychological injury," as defined in S 5K2.3, that can be 
       expected to be "protracted" but not "permanent." 
 
Jacobs, 167 F.3d at 801. 
 
Section 2A3.1 (the sexual abuse guideline), likeS 2A2.2 
(the aggravated assault guideline), provides a base offense 
level and, inter alia, calls for increases depending on 
whether "serious bodily injury" or "permanent or life- 
threatening injury" was inflicted on the victim. "Serious 
bodily injury" and "permanent or life-threatening injury" for 
purposes of both sections include impairment of a"mental 
faculty." Section S 5K2.8 (departure for"extreme conduct"), 
like S 5K2.3 (departure for "extreme psychological injury"), 
authorizes an upward departure where an extraordinary 
non-physical injury is inflicted, i.e., where the victim is 
subjected to unusually degrading conduct. Although 
S 2A3.1 deals with sexual abuse rather than assault and, 
accordingly, specifies a substantially higher base offense 
level, Jacobs's teachings may be helpful in determining a 
reasonable degree of departure here. 
 
As we have noted, if the victim in a sexual assault 
sustains "permanent or life-threatening bodily injury," 
S 2A3.1(b) dictates a four level increase in the offense level. 
If bodily injury is sustained that is neither "permanent" nor 
"life-threatening," but nevertheless serious, a two or three 
level increase is required. If one who inflicts non-physical 
injury in the course of a sexual assault is to be treated as 
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having culpability equal to that of one who inflicts 
comparable physical injury, it would appear unreasonable, 
in the absence of a persuasive explanation, to depart more 
than four levels in a situation like that before us or to 
depart more than three level without finding that the harm 
to the victim was life threatening or left continuing effects. 
 
I would also commend for the District Court's 
consideration the portion of our Kikumura opinion that 
discusses situations where the conduct giving rise to a 
departure is itself a crime independent of the offense 
charged. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1112. We there 
suggested that it would ordinarily not be reasonable to 
choose a degree of departure that would result in the 
defendant's receiving more total punishment than he would 
have received if he had been charged and convicted of both 
offenses. Here the conduct giving rise to the departure was 
an independent violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2241; when 
Queensborough ordered the two victims to have sex, he 
"knowingly [attempted to] cause . . . another person to 
engage in a sexual act . . . by threatening serious bodily 
injury." If he had been prosecuted for both offenses, they 
would each have had a total offense level of 32. Because 
there was an additional victim of the second crime, they 
would not have been grouped together and the combined 
offense level, under S 3D1.4, would have been 34. This 
produces a Guideline range from 151 to 188 months, a 
range substantially below the 240 months imposed here. 
 
I would stress, as we did in Jacobs, that the District 
Court would be free on remand to elect a different approach 
to determine what is a reasonable degree of departure on 
the facts of this case. I would, however, insist on a clear 
articulation of the reasons supporting the District Court's 
ultimate decision on an appropriate sentence.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Court's appendix and its recitation of the details of the offense 
and its impact on the victims powerfully communicates the character of 
the sexual abuse in this case. To the extent they are included in 
response to my dissent, however, they miss the point. The issue for me 
is not whether this record will support an upward departure or even 
whether it could justify a five-level upward departure. 
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A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




The sentencing judge in this case was required by 18 U.S.C. 
S 3553(c)(2) to state "the specific reason" for his departure in open 
court 
and in the court's judgment. In open court, the judge stated: 
 
        As is recited in the Presentence Report, and so that counsel had 
       notice, Paragraph 92, according to the basic Sentencing Guideline 
       that applies here for criminal sexual abuse, an upward departure is 
       warranted if the victim was sexually abused by more than one 
       participant, and as well under Section 5(k)(2.8), which deals with 
       extreme conduct. 
 
        And it says, if the defendant's conduct is unusually heinous, 
       cruel, brutal or degrading -- well, for a rape, I don't know that 
it 
       qualifies as unusually heinous, cruel or brutal; however, to then 
       order the two victims to have sex themselves, in your presence, at 
       the point of a gun, is unusually degrading. So I'm not going to 
       prolong it any longer." 
 
App. at 95. In its judgment, the Court stated: 
 
       The sentence departs from the guideline range for the following 
       specific reason(s): Extreme conduct pursuant to 5k2.8. The Court 
       finds defendant's conduct was unusally (sic) degrading to the 
victim. 
       One victim forced to have sex with another victim. 
 
App. at 113. 
 
It is thus unmistakably clear why the District Court departed. The 
problematic issues result from the fact that the Court gave no notice that 
it was considering a departure on that ground and the fact that it gave 
no explanation as to why it thought the order to have sex deserved 
punishment beyond that which could have been imposed based on a 
finding of permanent physical or psychological injury to the victims. 
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